Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3932551
DOI10.2307/2297198zbMath0476.90003OpenAlexW2054004231MaRDI QIDQ3932551
Hugo Sonnenschein, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 1981
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297198
public goodssocial choicedictatorshipnonbossinesspoints of differentiabilitystrategy-proof allocation mechanisms
Related Items
Overlapping multiple object assignments, House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly, Decentralized college admissions under single application, Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations, An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money, On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties, Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms, Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model, Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities, Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application, Constrained school choice, Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems, Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach, Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks, Order independence for iterated weak dominance, Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain, The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix, Strategy-proof allotment rules, When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?], Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets, On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems, Children crying at birthday parties. Why?, Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms, Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model, Hierarchical allocation, The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game, Menu mechanisms, Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods, Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies, School choice with preference rank classes, Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules, Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement, Non-bossy social classification, Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources, Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods, Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case, Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results, A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production, Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation, A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems, On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness, Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences, Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects, Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments, Secure implementation in production economies, Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies, Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents, Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions, Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses, A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents, The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness, Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable, Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation, Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design, Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies, Incentive compatibility without compensation, Non-bossiness, Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good, Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization, Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences, Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems, Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object, Strategy-proof coalition formation, Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing, IRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES, Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets, Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms, Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies, Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems, Peter J. Hammond, Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies, Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies, Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences, Strategy-proof risk sharing, Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods, House allocation with transfers, The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity, Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods, Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees., Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions, Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale, Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives, Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear, When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds, Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences, Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints, Influence in private-goods allocation, Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models, Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive, Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects, Social Choice Theory, Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants, Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives, Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler, Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market, Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms, Nonmanipulability in two dimensions, The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice, Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies, Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects, Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation, Selecting a winner with external referees, Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints, Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources, Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result
