Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem

DOI10.2307/2297147zbMath0477.90004OpenAlexW2050960178MaRDI QIDQ3934104

David M. Grether, Charles R. Plott

Publication date: 1982

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297147

zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theoremnonbinary social choicesets of feasible alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (22)

Arrow's choice axiom ⋮ Voting operators in the space of choice functions ⋮ Some impossibility results with domain restrictions ⋮ Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ⋮ Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative ⋮ Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ Some further results on nonbinary social choice ⋮ Social choice in economic environments ⋮ Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness ⋮ Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems ⋮ Symmetric social choices and collective rationality ⋮ The Arrow and Plott independence conditions ⋮ Continuous-valued social choice ⋮ Impossibility results for choice correspondences ⋮ On non-binary social choice ⋮ Independent social choice correspondences ⋮ A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice ⋮ Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions ⋮ New problems in the general choice theory

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