Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
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Publication:3942696
DOI10.2307/2297362zbMath0483.90005OpenAlexW2058135751MaRDI QIDQ3942696
Publication date: 1982
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297362
value of informationrisk sharingimperfect informationagency information problemgeneralized agency modelincentive purpuses
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