Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions

DOI10.2307/2297367zbMath0483.90012OpenAlexW2089309032MaRDI QIDQ3942700

Richard D. McKelvey, David M. Grether, John A. Ferejohn

Publication date: 1982

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-145311553

zbMATH Keywords

public goodssophisticated equilibriumimplementable social choice functionequilibria for n-person gamesminimally democratic setunrestricted preference domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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