The Proportional Veto Principle
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Publication:3944275
DOI10.2307/2297154zbMath0484.90006OpenAlexW1978412738MaRDI QIDQ3944275
Publication date: 1981
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297154
simple gamesstable outcomeanonymous veto functionscooperative instabilitydistribution of power among coalitionsproportional veto principle
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