Minimax Policies for Unobservable Inspections

DOI10.1287/moor.7.1.139zbMath0498.90040OpenAlexW2071842402MaRDI QIDQ3964307

Harvey Diamond

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.139

zbMATH Keywords

inspectorequilibrium strategiestwo-person zero-sum gamecomputational procedurecalculation of optimal policiesinspecteeminimax expected lossrandomized inspection policyunobservable inspections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Reliability and life testing (62N05)

Related Items (9)

Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources ⋮ Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game ⋮ Inspection Games ⋮ Which inspection approach is better to prevent drug fraud: announced or unannounced? ⋮ Playing for time: a sequential inspection game ⋮ Timely inspection and deterrence ⋮ Inspection games in arms control ⋮ A Generalization of Diamond’s Inspection Model: Errors of the First and Second Kind ⋮ Distributing inspections in space and time -- proposed solution of a difficult problem

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