Myopic Versus Intertemporal Manipulation in Decentralized Planning Procedures

DOI10.2307/2296964zbMath0501.90011OpenAlexW2051464875MaRDI QIDQ3967312

Jean-Charles Rochet, Guy Laroque

Publication date: 1983

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296964

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcompetitive equilibriummanipulationPareto-optimal allocationabstract planning proceduresexchange economies with private goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria

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