A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods

DOI10.2307/2296963zbMath0502.90003OpenAlexW2025251830MaRDI QIDQ3968708

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 1983

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296963

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesspublic goodsindividual rationalityneutralitydominant strategyplanning procedurescheatproofnesslocal truthful revelation of preferencesMDP proceduresstrongly locally individually incentive compatible procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Incentive compatibility without compensation ⋮ Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches ⋮ Price-quantity duality in planning procedures

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