Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

DOI10.2307/1913392zbMath0503.90019OpenAlexW2158486621WikidataQ29307898 ScholiaQ29307898MaRDI QIDQ3970126

Vincent P. Crawford, Alexander S. Jun. Kelso

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6991ca1170f3efb723ead5424ab6638d110d858

zbMATH Keywords

comparative staticsexistence of equilibriumcoalition formationjob matchinggross substitutesadding agents to the marketcompetitive adjustment processeslabor markets with perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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