Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games

DOI10.2307/2526875zbMath0738.90018OpenAlexW1988769906MaRDI QIDQ3978430

James A. Dearden

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526875

zbMATH Keywords

regular equilibriarepeated bargaining gamessealed bid \(k\)-double auctiontheory of disagreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations

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