Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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Publication:3978782
DOI10.2307/2938299zbMath0735.90075OpenAlexW2138757993MaRDI QIDQ3978782
David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti, Dilip Abreu
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938299
factorizationimperfect monitoringsequential equilibriaself-generationNash equilibrium in pure strategiesasymmetric repeated gamesbang-bang reward functionsimperfect modellingrepeated discounted games
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