Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.025zbMath1293.91105OpenAlexW1966445636MaRDI QIDQ397941

Ronald A. Dye, Sri S. Sridharan

Publication date: 12 August 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.025

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddepressed incentivesincreasing residual valuesoptimal contractingrandom private benefits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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