Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.03.019zbMath1293.91088OpenAlexW2074341519MaRDI QIDQ397961

Yan Long

Publication date: 12 August 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.019

zbMATH Keywords

worst case analysiscommon valueaverage value functionseller revenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Worst-case equilibria
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
• Competitive auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition

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