Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package

DOI10.1007/BF00437234zbMath0736.90020OpenAlexW2092892761MaRDI QIDQ3980458

Frederick van der Ploeg, A. J. Markink

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Computer Science in Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00437234

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectationstime inconsistencyinfinite horizonscooperative, decentralized Nash outcomedecentralized Stackelberg outcomesquadratic preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-04)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package

Uses Software

• POREM

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nonzero-sum differential games
• Further properties of nonzero-sum differential games
• On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation
• Saddlepoint Problems in Continuous Time Rational Expectations Models: A General Method and Some Macroeconomic Examples
• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
• Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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