Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms

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Publication:3986750

DOI10.1287/moor.16.3.447zbMath0813.90138OpenAlexW1994233348WikidataQ114598549 ScholiaQ114598549MaRDI QIDQ3986750

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Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/4bd5eb9e-328a-45a0-aa0a-edbd38168d88




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