Market and Locational Equilibrium for Two Competitors

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Publication:3988905

DOI10.1287/opre.39.5.749zbMath0741.90006OpenAlexW2027685812MaRDI QIDQ3988905

S. Louis Hakimi, Martine Labbé

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/272383/files/erasmus201.pdf




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