Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model
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Publication:3989003
DOI10.2307/2297931zbMath0751.90013OpenAlexW2044956951MaRDI QIDQ3989003
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297931
Related Items (9)
Price competition for an informed buyer ⋮ Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium large markets with non-manipulable residual demand ⋮ Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies. ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network ⋮ When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? ⋮ On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games ⋮ Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination ⋮ Static search games played over graphs and general metric spaces
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