No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
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Publication:3989223
DOI10.2307/2938288zbMath0744.90007OpenAlexW2081077891WikidataQ59972977 ScholiaQ59972977MaRDI QIDQ3989223
Koichi Tadenuma, William Thomson
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938288
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