Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences
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Publication:3989225
DOI10.2307/2938291zbMath0747.90007OpenAlexW4241014394MaRDI QIDQ3989225
Peter P. Wakker, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b2b8aaeee5d1de24fd25a00d91d4837f12a8f6e4
independence of irrelevant alternativesNash bargaining solutionstrong axiom of revealed preferencecontinuous single-valued choice function
Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (25)
Introduction to the special issue in honor of Peter Wakker ⋮ Law of demand and stochastic choice ⋮ Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets ⋮ Single-peaked choice ⋮ Stability, fairness and random walks in the bargaining problem ⋮ Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions ⋮ Fuzzy choice functions, revealed preference and rationality ⋮ On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems ⋮ Cycle-preserving extension of demand functions to new commodities ⋮ Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments ⋮ The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints ⋮ A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems ⋮ A canon of probabilistic rationality ⋮ Ex-ante estate division under strong Pareto efficiency ⋮ Uncovered bargaining solutions ⋮ Rational choice with status quo bias ⋮ Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice ⋮ Maximality with or without binariness: transfer-type characterizations ⋮ Rational choice and two-person bargaining solutions ⋮ Rationality of bargaining solutions ⋮ Welfarism and rationalizability in allocation problems with indivisibilities ⋮ Inequality averse collective choice ⋮ Choice on the simplex domain ⋮ The Choquet bargaining solutions
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