Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection

DOI10.1016/0147-5967(92)90116-OzbMath0745.90002OpenAlexW3125749169MaRDI QIDQ3991529

Liang Zou

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Comparative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-5967(92)90116-o

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selectionprincipal-agent environmentexistence of asymptotically optimal threat-based incentive mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Application models in control theory (93C95)

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Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems ⋮ Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents

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