OPTIMAL DYNAMIC PROFIT TAXATION: THE DERIVATION OF FEEDBACK STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA

DOI10.1111/j.1467-999X.1991.tb00365.xzbMath0744.90011MaRDI QIDQ3991703

Raymond H. J. M. Gradus

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

feedback Stackelberg equilibriumopen-loop Stackelberg equilibriumbetween government and firmsoptimal profit taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Application models in control theory (93C95) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Public versus Private Retirement Pensions: A Stackelberg Differential Game ⋮ On coincidence of feedback Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria in economic applications of differential games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• Nonzero-sum differential games
• Uncertainty and Lags in the Investment Decisions of Firms

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