scientific article

Publication date: 23 January 1993

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

market models subgame perfect equilibrium bargaining theory extensive games with a sequential structure trading procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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