Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

DOI10.2307/2951601zbMath0761.90024OpenAlexW2022649148MaRDI QIDQ4006271

Philip J. Reny, R. Preston McAfee

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951601

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationstochastic dominanceprivate informationtwo person bargainingmechanism design games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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