On Hierarchical Spatial Competition

DOI10.2307/2297961zbMath0751.90114OpenAlexW2078774200MaRDI QIDQ4006316

Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297961

zbMATH Keywords

dominant playershierarchical equilibriumhierarchical model of spatial electoral competitionperfect-foresight equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Voting theory (91B12) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

Related Items (12)

DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY ⋮ Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence ⋮ The two-party system under alternative voting procedures ⋮ Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry ⋮ How good is a two-party election game? ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? ⋮ Sequential location problems ⋮ Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates ⋮ Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives ⋮ Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate? ⋮ A quadratically convergent method for computing simple singular roots and its application to determining simple bifurcation points

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