On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
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Publication:4008552
DOI10.2307/2297858zbMath0763.90018OpenAlexW1780438474MaRDI QIDQ4008552
Andrew Atkeson, Robert E. jun. Lucas
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297858
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