The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

DOI10.2307/2297865zbMath0763.90110OpenAlexW1986454804MaRDI QIDQ4008556

Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297865

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesimperfect monitoringpure-strategy sequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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