Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models

DOI10.2307/2297866zbMath0764.90002OpenAlexW1566812888MaRDI QIDQ4008557

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Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1904/1/noisy.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationnoisy observationadverse selection modelsprincipal-agent contracting problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Value of communication in agencies ⋮ Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach ⋮ Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics ⋮ On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment ⋮ Regulation of a risk averse firm ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

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