Joint Coherence in Games of Incomplete Information

DOI10.1287/MNSC.38.3.374zbMath0764.90095OpenAlexW2120165663MaRDI QIDQ4012775

Robert F. Nau

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.3.374

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintycoherencecorrelated equilibriumarbitragecommon prior assumptionBayesian equilibriumcommunication equilibriumsubjective probability theoryincomplete-information gameNash quilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (9)

An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' rule ⋮ Coherent decision analysis with inseparable probabilities and utilities ⋮ Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited ⋮ The incoherence of agreeing to disagree ⋮ Incorporating ignorance within game theory: an imprecise probability approach ⋮ Coherent behavior in noncooperative games ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information ⋮ Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games

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