An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
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Publication:4013232
DOI10.2307/2951567zbMath0764.90093OpenAlexW2172873870WikidataQ56482315 ScholiaQ56482315MaRDI QIDQ4013232
Thomas R. Palfrey, Richard D. McKelvey
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145049106
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