Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium
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Publication:4013235
DOI10.2307/2951570zbMath0764.90091OpenAlexW2080666022MaRDI QIDQ4013235
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951570
2-person games (91A05) Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-08)
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