Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information

DOI10.2307/2951522zbMath0785.90027OpenAlexW1972942508MaRDI QIDQ4016182

Faruk Gul, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 9 December 1992

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951522

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic efficiencyrational expectationsincomplete informationprivate informationincentive compatibilitylarge exchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (20)

The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems ⋮ Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives ⋮ Informational robustness of competitive equilibria. ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies ⋮ Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents ⋮ Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary ⋮ Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies ⋮ The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information ⋮ Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality ⋮ Core convergence with asymmetric information ⋮ Aggregation of expert opinions ⋮ Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core ⋮ Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information ⋮ Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. ⋮ Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.

This page was built for publication: Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information