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On the Position Value for Communication Situations - MaRDI portal

On the Position Value for Communication Situations

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4018842

DOI10.1137/0405023zbMath0788.90087OpenAlexW2084702601MaRDI QIDQ4018842

Guillermo Owen, S. H. Tijs, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/666314/26985_12946.pdf




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