Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
From MaRDI portal
Publication:402062
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.011zbMath1296.91207OpenAlexW3021943941MaRDI QIDQ402062
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/03-2012-cah.pdf
Related Items
Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof, Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf, The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects, Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values, Non-bossiness, Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences, A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties, Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
Cites Work
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Farsighted house allocation
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Consistent house allocation
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Kidney Exchange
- School Choice with Consent*
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- House allocation with transfers
