Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
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Publication:402069
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.002zbMath1296.91174OpenAlexW2007097209MaRDI QIDQ402069
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1333.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (26)
Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ Efficient lottery design ⋮ Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties ⋮ The object allocation problem with random priorities ⋮ Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation with outside option ⋮ On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems ⋮ Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ A new impossibility result for random assignments ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea ⋮ Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem ⋮ On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful ⋮ Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
Cites Work
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
- School Choice with Consent*
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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