Stable marriages and search frictions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.001zbMath1296.91209OpenAlexW2144864945MaRDI QIDQ402071

Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke

Publication date: 27 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/36240/5/PUBL_Lauermann_Noeldeke_2014_Stable_marriages_ext.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingssearch frictionsmarriage marketnontransferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Dynamically stable matching ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time ⋮ Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions ⋮ Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets ⋮ A college admissions clearinghouse

Cites Work

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• Marriage and Class
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Assortative Matching and Search
• The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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