Stable marriages and search frictions
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Publication:402071
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.001zbMath1296.91209OpenAlexW2144864945MaRDI QIDQ402071
Stephan Lauermann, Georg Nöldeke
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://edoc.unibas.ch/36240/5/PUBL_Lauermann_Noeldeke_2014_Stable_marriages_ext.pdf
Related Items (6)
Dynamically stable matching ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time ⋮ Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions ⋮ Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets ⋮ A college admissions clearinghouse
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- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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- The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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