Dynamic strategic information transmission

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.012zbMath1296.91181OpenAlexW3122181997MaRDI QIDQ402084

Aleh Tsyvinski, Vasiliki Skreta, Mikhail Golosov, Andrea Wilson

Publication date: 27 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/30282

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcheap talkdynamic strategic communicationfull information revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (21)

Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Goodwill in communication ⋮ Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games ⋮ Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning ⋮ A Markovian Stackelberg game approach for computing an optimal dynamic mechanism ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria ⋮ Buyer-optimal extensionproof information ⋮ Feedback control using a strategic sensor ⋮ Incomplete contracts versus communication ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

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• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

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