Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
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Publication:4021529
DOI10.2307/2297996zbMath0771.90004OpenAlexW2260413180MaRDI QIDQ4021529
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/833.pdf
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