Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games

DOI10.1287/moor.17.3.509zbMath0760.90003OpenAlexW2039777237MaRDI QIDQ4022015

Michel Le Breton, Georges Bordes, Maurice Salles

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.17.3.509

zbMATH Keywords

core voting game uncovered set nonemptiness conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ The uncovered set and indifference in spatial models: a fuzzy set approach ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results ⋮ Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

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