Fully absorbing dynamic compromise

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013zbMath1297.91086OpenAlexW1984377833MaRDI QIDQ403722

Michael Richter

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriadynamic legislative bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (6)

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ⋮ Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power ⋮ Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo

Uses Software

• repgames

Cites Work

• The dynamics of distributive politics
• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• Can negotiations prevent fish wars?
• Strategic bargaining with destructive power.
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• On dynamic compromise
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

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