Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0392-8zbMath1302.91110OpenAlexW1976140092MaRDI QIDQ403964

Jeroen M. Swinkels, Vlad Mares

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0392-8

zbMATH Keywords

differentiationmechanism designasymmetric auctionsprocurementfirst price auctionsrequest for proposalsecond price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids

Cites Work

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• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
• Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
• Biased procurement auctions
• Convex set functions in d-space
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions

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