The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0398-2zbMath1302.91016OpenAlexW2046857073MaRDI QIDQ403976

Anirban Kar, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0398-2

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueNash bargaining solutionmaximizing expected Nash welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• Value, consistency, and random coalition formation
• The Bargaining Problem

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