Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0403-9zbMath1300.91036OpenAlexW1993504941MaRDI QIDQ403981

Naoki Kojima

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0403-9

zbMATH Keywords

revelation principlebudget constraintindirect mechanismmulti-dimensional mechanismtaxation principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Set-valued analysis

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