Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
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Publication:4045859
DOI10.2307/1914217zbMath0293.90020OpenAlexW1969043190MaRDI QIDQ4045859
Kiyoshi Kuga, Hiroaki Nagatani
Publication date: 1974
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914217
Related Items (20)
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