On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
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Publication:404743
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0746-yzbMath1302.91156OpenAlexW3124650609MaRDI QIDQ404743
Paula Jaramillo, Çağatay Kayı, Flip Klijn
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10830
Related Items (4)
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' ⋮ Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
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