A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0755-xzbMath1302.91089OpenAlexW2012757997MaRDI QIDQ404746

Shin Sato

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0755-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model ⋮ On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness

Cites Work

• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Circular domains
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Dictatorial domains
• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Unnamed Item

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