Tax differentiation, lobbying, and welfare

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0753-ZzbMath1302.91142OpenAlexW1965629572MaRDI QIDQ404761

Sandro Brusco, Luca Colombo, Umberto Galmarini

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0753-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation
• Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates
• Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
• Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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