Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0775-6zbMath1297.91093OpenAlexW2061278102MaRDI QIDQ404762

Christian Trudeau, Eric Bahel

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0775-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation

Cites Work

• Nearly serial sharing methods
• Ordinal cost sharing
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
• Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
• The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing

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