A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0781-8zbMath1297.91115OpenAlexW2092222564MaRDI QIDQ404766

Matt Van Essen

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0781-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods

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