Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
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Publication:404767
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0790-7zbMath1297.91061OpenAlexW1966297040MaRDI QIDQ404767
Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0790-7
Related Items (3)
Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules ⋮ Breadth of loss due to manipulation ⋮ On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture
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