Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
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Publication:404769
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0784-5zbMath1297.91062OpenAlexW1998954346MaRDI QIDQ404769
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0784-5
Related Items (3)
Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment ⋮ (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting ⋮ Voting on tricky questions
Cites Work
- Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
- Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
- Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
- One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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